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Résumé / Abstract
Prenons une économie où un entrepreneur a besoin de financement afin
d'entreprendre un projet risqué dont le coût est fixe et dont le rendement peut être
faible ou élevé. Supposons alors que ce rendement est une information privée de
l'entrepreneur. Si le montant que l'entrepreneur doit rembourser au financier
dépend du rendement sur le projet risqué, s'il est coûteux pour le financier de
vérifier le rendement réel du projet, et si le financier ne peut se commettre en une
stratégie de vérification, alors il devient optimal pour l'entrepreneur de ne pas dire
la vérité tout le temps. Nous trouvons premièrement que l'entrepreneur sur-finance
son projet d'investissement si le financier ne peut se commettre, et deuxièmement
que l'entrepreneur a une plus grande richesse ex post si le projet ne porte pas fruit.
Ce sur-financement et cette plus grande richesse dans le mauvais état de la nature
sont le produit de l'absence d'engagement de la part du principal qui doit utiliser
ces signaux coûteux afin de réduire le nombre de faux messages dans l'économie.
Suppose an entrepreneur needs funds from a financier to invest in a risky
project whose cost is fixed, and whose return may be high or low. Suppose also
that the project’s realized return is an information that is private to the
entrepreneur. If the amount the entrepreneur pays back to the financier depends
on the risky project’s outcome, if it is costly for the financier to verify the project’s
true realized return, and if the financier cannot commit to an auditing strategy,
then it is optimal for the entrepreneur to misreport the true state of the world with
some probability. In other words, it is in the entrepreneur’s interest to lie with a
degree of probability. We find that the entrepreneur over-finances his project
when the financier cannot commit, and that he has greater wealth ex post if the
project is not successful. Over-borrowing and greater wealth in the low-return
state result in reducing the number of false reports in the economy.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
When an individual has a risky project to invest in, he may go to a banker to borrow the funds that
are needed. If he has some private information concerning the project, he may then …nd it in his
best interest to attempt to extract a rent from the …nancier. For example, the entrepreneur1 may
shirk his responsibilities, thus reducing the probability that the project will have a high return.
This problem of shirking responsibilities is known as ex ante moral hazard in the literature.
Another type of asymmetric information between the entrepreneur and the …nancier concerns
the return on the project. If the transfer between the entrepreneur and the …nancier depends on a
message sent by the entrepreneur after he has privately witnessed the state of the world (i.e.: he
is the only one to know what the return on the investment is), then the entrepreneur may have an
incentive to misreport this information to the …nancier. This incentive can be viewed as a problem
of ex post moral hazard. We focus exclusively on the ex post moral hazard problem in this paper.
A well known result in the literature (see Townsend, 1979, and Gale and Hellwig, 1987) is that
if there is ex post moral hazard on the part of the entrepreneur, and if the …nancier can commit to
a deterministic auditing strategy, the optimal contract between the two players will be what Gale
and Hellwig call a standard debt contract. A standard debt contract speci…es that an entrepreneur
who is able to make his scheduled payments (interest on the debt, presumably) is not audited. As
soon as he misses a payment, however, he is audited and all his assets are seized. In this type of
contract, it is not optimal for an entrepreneur to miss a payment he is able to make. Since he is
always audited when he misses a payment, his cheating will be invariably discovered.
On the other side of the market is the …nancier. For the …nancier, the provisions of the standard
debt contract seem attractive: by auditing every time a payment is missed, she is guaranteed that
no payment capable of being made is ever missed. Unfortunately, when the time comes to audit a
missed payment, both the …nancier and the entrepreneur …nd it optimal to renegotiate2 that part
of the contract. If the …nancier knows that the entrepreneur has told the truth (because telling the
truth is always the best strategy), and that auditing the entrepreneur is costly, then she will want
to renegotiate the contract to reduce her audit costs. The entrepreneur also wants to renegotiate
since he has nothing to gain by being audited.
If the entrepreneur willingly agrees to give everything to the …nancier, then he may be rewarded
1For the remainder of the paper, the …nancier shall be a she, and the entrepreneur shall be a he.
2Surprisingly Shleifer and Vishny (1997) do not mention this renegotiation problem in their survey of corporate
governance. This renegotiation is not the same as the possibility of bribing a manager, a possibility they do mention.
Gale and Hellwig (1989) discuss the possible renegotiation game between the entrepreneur and the …nancier.
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by the …nancier who might be willing to share the savings generated by not conducting the audit.
In other words, when there is an audit, the payo¤ to the entrepreneur is zero, while the payo¤ to
the …nancier is WL ¡ c, where WL is the residual wealth of the entrepreneur in case of bankruptcy
and c is the cost of auditing. If no audits are conducted, and the entrepreneur willingly gives his
residual wealth to the …nancier, then the payo¤s to the agents are "c for the entrepreneur and
W ¡ "c for the …nancier, where " < 1 is whatever percentage of the savings the …nancier is willing
to share with the entrepreneur. In this instance not auditing Pareto-dominates auditing, at least
ex post.
If the entrepreneur knows that the …nancier never wants to audit ex post, he will …nd it in his
best interest to always miss a payment. If the …nancier knows that the entrepreneur always misses
a payment, the …nancier will not be so inclined to never audit. In the end what happens is that the
entrepreneur sometimes misses the payment on purpose, and the …nancier audits only a fraction of
the payments that are missed.3 In game theory terms, the players are playing mixed strategies.
We shall thus relax the assumption that the …nancier can commit to an auditing strategy.
Without commitment, the …nancier cannot guarantee that the entrepreneur will always reveal the
project’s true realized return. This means that the incentive compatibility constraint is substituted
by Nash equilibrium constraints for the entrepreneur and the …nancier. The optimal reporting
strategy of the entrepreneur and the optimal auditing strategy of the …nancier yield a Perfect
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) in mixed strategies. This PBNE tells us how the players are
behaving when Nature decides the project’s realized return. The goal of this paper is therefore to
design the optimal contract between an entrepreneur and a …nancier taking into account the Nash
behavior of the players. This would imply that the contract we hereby derive is not …rst- or even
second-best. In fact it is a third-best contract, given the impossibility of implementing the second
best contract that would be obtained using the revelation principle.4
The problem studied is closely related to that of sovereign debt as presented by Gale and Hellwig
(1989). The di¤erence in the modelling is that Gale and Hellwig do not allow the …nancier to seize
the assets of the country who misreports its ability to repay its debt. Auditing then becomes merely
a way of potentially punishing the entrepreneur. We allow the …nancier to collect what she would
have collected had the entrepreneur told the truth. We do not, however, allow the …nancier to be
able to collect any penalty from the borrowing country. As in Gale and Hellwig, the penalty is
strictly paid by the entrepreneur. This means that the penalty can be viewed as a sunk cost.
3Picard (1996) and Boyer (2000) provides a discussion of the commitment problem for a principal in an insurance
fraud context, while Khalil (1997) does the same in a monopoly regulation context.
4Loosely put, the revelation principle basically states that amongst all implementable second-best contracts, there
is at least one where truth telling is always obtained; see Myerson (1979).
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1.2 Findings
The main …ndings of this paper are three-fold. First, there exists a unique PBNE in mixed strategies
in what is called the payment game. Using a two-point distribution of the returns, the PBNE is
such that: 1- the entrepreneur always tells the truth if the low return is realized; 2- the entrepreneur
plays a mixed strategy between reporting a high return and reporting a low return if the high return
is realized; 3- the …nancier never audits the report of a high return; and 4- the …nancier audits the
report of a low return a fraction of the time. As shown by Gale and Hellwig (1989), this is the only
equilibrium that passes the Kohlberg-Mertens selection criterion.
The second result of the paper is that the entrepreneur ends up with greater wealth ex post if
the project has a low return than if the project has a high return. This means that the di¤erence
between a project’s realized return and the payment made to the …nancier is smaller when the
project has a high return than when it has a low return. In the low return state, it is as if
the …nancier were forgiving part of the entrepreneur’s debt. The occurrence of this …nding was
hypothesized by Rajan (1992) and Bester (1994).
Finally, the third …nding indicates that the proportion of outside …nancing is greater when the
…nancier cannot commit to an auditing strategy than when she can commit. This last …nding
resembles that of Khalil and Parigi (1998) who …nd that the amount invested increases when there
is no commitment. We, on the other hand, …nd that the amount …nanced increases when there is
no commitment.
The main reason why more outside …nancing occurs when there is no commitment is that it
is a way for the …nancier to signal that she has more to lose by not auditing. By lending more,
the …nancier has more to lose if the entrepreneur is not caught cheating. This creates an incentive
for the entrepreneur to cheat less often. The same type of reasoning can be used to explain why
the entrepreneur is better o¤ ex post in the low return state. Looking at what happens from the
…nancier’s point of view, it is clear that under commitment, the …nancier collects more if the return
is high than if it is low. The same is true when there is no commitment, except that the di¤erence
between the amounts collected is greater. By increasing the di¤erence between what she collects
in the high return state and what she collects in the low return state, the …nancier sends the signal
that she has a lot to lose by letting the entrepreneur get away with announcing the wrong state
of the world. The entrepreneur must then scale down his probability of lying to internalize these
implicit incentives for the …nancier to audit.
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1.3 The Literature
There is a wide-ranging and extensive literature on agency problems between a …nancier and an
entrepreneur. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a survey of the literature on the general subject
of corporate governance. We shall complement this survey by focusing on the problem of an
entrepreneur who has private information regarding the return on his investment, and who must
report that return to a …nancier. Given that his …nal wealth depends on the report he makes, there
is an incentive to misreport the actual return. This incentive to misreport is known as ex post
moral hazard.
In a world where it cost nothing to verify the agent’s report, the principal should always verify,
and no misreporting should ever occur. Gale and Hellwig (1985) characterize the optimal contract
between an entrepreneur and a …nancier5 where they …nd that the optimal contract is a debt
contract where the entrepreneur is never audited as long as he is able to make his (…xed) interest
payment, but is always audited if he misses a payment (declares bankruptcy and his assets are
seized). In both papers it is possible to demonstrate that the level of investment is reduced because
of moral hazard and costly bankruptcy, just as in Grossman and Hart (1986).
In every paper mentioned so far, there is the assumption that the principal is able to commit
to the exact strategy that induces truth-telling. Unfortunately, such a commitment may not be
credible. If the principal knows that the agent has told the truth, what is the point of conducting
an audit? This inability to commit has the consequence that the agent attempts to extract rents
with some probability. It also induces the principal to audit with greater probability than under
full commitment.
The commitment problem has attracted a fair amount of research.6 For example, let us mention
Gale and Hellwig (1989), Scheepens (1995), Persons (1997), and Khalil and Parigi (1998). These
papers are similar to the one we present, but with some important di¤erences. For example Scheep-
ens’ entrepreneur is risk-neutral, while ours is risk-averse. He also assumes that the detection of a
fraudulent bankruptcy is not perfect. Finally, he restricts his analysis to standard debt contracts,
and looks at the optimal behavior of the players in terms of such contracts. Our model goes further,
as the optimality of the debt contract per se is reconsidered when the …nancier cannot commit to
5See also Hellwig (1977), Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1989), and Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Bond
and Crocker (1997) in an insurance context.
6Beaudry and Poitevin (1995) study a commitment problem, but it is the entrepreneur’s commitment not to
seek supplemental …nancing from a second …nancier that is of interest to them. Gobert and Poitevin (1997) also
relax the assumption of an agent’s commitment to a contract. Using a multi-period setting where an agent’s future
income is unknown and where a principal can to some extent smooth out future income with a contract, they show
that allowing agents to save some of their earnings may mitigate some of the agent’s commitment problems. In an
insurance setting, see Picard (1996) and Boyer (2000).
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an auditing strategy.
Khalil and Parigi (1998) approach the problem from a di¤erent angle. While both players
are risk neutral, the entrepreneur’s production function is chosen to be increasing and concave
so that his payo¤ is an increasing function of his investment. Also they let the entrepreneur
choose the absolute size of the project rather than the proportion he invests in it. Another major
di¤erence is that we make an explicit distinction between the investment period and the payo¤
period. Khalil and Parigi make no such di¤erence. Khalil and Parigi also let the penalty imposed
on the entrepreneur who is caught sending the wrong message be paid to the …nancier, while our
penalty is a deadweight cost to society. Finally, whereas Khalil (1997) maximize the …nancier’s
pro…ts, we maximize the entrepreneur’s expected utility.
Persons (1997) approaches the problem from the point of view of many investors who are
implicated in the project’s …nancing. What this does is introduce a strategic interaction between
the …nanciers in determining who must audit. Persons …nds that in order to induce an optimal level
of auditing, the contract must stipulate that the party who does not conduct the audit must be
penalized if the other party conducts the audit and …nds the entrepreneur to have misrepresented
the state of the world. He also assumes that the penalty paid by the entrepreneur if the latter
is found to have misreported the state of the world is contractible. This means that his contract
stipulates a very large transfer from the entrepreneur to the …nancier if he is found to have cheated.
This very large transfer motivates the …nancier to audit more often since auditing becomes a way
to make money. He bases this assumption on the work of Betker (1995) who …nds that creditors’
committees are allowed to recover their expenses. In reality, however, the entire penalty payment
does not necessarily go to this committee. For example, an entrepreneur found guilty of fraudulent
bankruptcy may go to prison; this penalty does not bene…t the …nanciers. Another example where
the penalty is not paid to the creditors is in the case of sovereign debt. A country cannot be forced
by the courts to pay an amount to some …nancier who feels wronged. The greatest penalty that
can be in‡icted is that no …nancier will ever want to do business with that country in the future.
One of the ways in which our paper di¤ers from the previous two is from the point of view
of the penalty. In that respect we follow Gale and Hellwig (1989) in presuming that it may not
be possible to ensure that the monetary penalty for lying is paid. Therefore, we let the penalty
be only the di¤erence between the entrepreneur’s expected utility when he purchases the contract,
and his expected utility if he remains in autarchy. In other words, the penalty is only that he is
shutout of the market forever. Thus the penalty is not paid to the …nancier, it is only paid by the
entrepreneur.
The model applies easily to the problem of sovereign debt as developed by Bulow and Rogo¤
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(1989) and Gale and Hellwig (1989). Our paper looks at a particular equilibrium outcome of Gale
and Hellwig’s renegotiation game, and derives the optimal contract given that equilibrium. The
equilibrium outcome we shall use is the one called separating by Gale and Hellwig. As anticipated
by Gale and Hellwig, the equilibrium leads to a Pareto-dominated outcome.
The remainder of the paper goes as follows. The basic assumptions of the model, the setup of
the model and the parameters used are presented in the next section. The payment game played
between the entrepreneur and the …nancier is also developed in Section 2. In Section 3, we develop
the model. We …nd the optimal contract between the informed entrepreneur and the uninformed
…nancier. Finally Section 4 discusses the implications of such a contract and concludes.
2 Assumptions and Setup
Players are in…nitely lived. Their utility is equal to the discounted sum of their expected utilities
in each period. The discount rate is the same for every player, ± < 1. Each period is divided into
two stages, the …nancing/investment stage and the return/game/payo¤ stage. These stages are not
discounted. The entrepreneur is risk averse with a twice di¤erentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function over …nal wealth (U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0, U 0(0) =1, U 0(1) = 0), and receives exogenous
wage Y in each stage of each period. The …nancier is risk neutral and expects to make zero pro…t
on each contract. The entrepreneur has no memory, while the …nancier has a perfect memory.7
In the …rst stage the entrepreneur may consume his wage and/or invest in a risky project. The
project pays o¤ in the second stage. The project is unique, indivisible and costs I > 0. Let ®
denote the share of the investment contributed by the entrepreneur himself. This means that he
needs to …nance D = (1¡®)I on the outside. In the second stage, Nature decides on the project’s
realization. There are only two possible returns on investment (ROI), WLI and
WH
I , withWH > WL.
WH occurs with probability ¼. The actual ROI is private information to the entrepreneur. The
…nancier can learn about the return if she incurs an auditing cost, c.
Given that the entrepreneur …nances some amount D in the …rst stage, he needs to pay it back
in the second stage. If the high return is realized, then the entrepreneur needs to pay back RHD.
If the low return is realized, then he needs to pay back RLD. Therefore the contract speci…es a
payback schedule contingent on the announced state of the world. These paybacks are subject
to limited liability constraints: RiD · Wi, i 2 fL;Hg. These limited liability constraints mean
that the entrepreneur cannot be forced to pay back more than the total return on the project in
each state. This game is then played every period until the entrepreneur is caught sending a false
7We make these two assumptions only in order to evacuate reputation concerns in the …rst case, and to make the
autarchic penalty credible in the second case.
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message, in which case no contract are ever signed (the entrepreneur is in autarchy). The sequence
of the game in any period T is shown in …gure 1.
Figure 1: Sequence of play.
In this setup, the entrepreneur is not constrained to tell the truth. In fact, upon learning about
the realized ROI, he may misreport it to the …nancier. The reason why truth-telling may not
be the optimal strategy for the entrepreneur is that the …nancier cannot commit credibly to an
auditing strategy. This means that the …nancier audits only if she …nds it in her best interest to
do so ex post. If the entrepreneur lies and the …nancier audits, then the lie shall be discovered
with probability one. In this event, the payment from the entrepreneur to the …nancier is equal to
what he would have paid had he not lied, but the entrepreneur must also incur some penalty. This
penalty, measured in utility terms, is a deadweight cost to the economy in the sense that it is paid
by the entrepreneur, but is not collected by the …nancier. This penalty represents the foregone
utility of remaining in autarchy. We shall denote this foregone utility k.8 A table listing all the
possible payo¤s to the …nancier and the entrepreneur which are contingent upon every possible
outcome is provided in the appendix as Table 1.
Before presenting the maximization problem per se, let’s start by presenting the equilibrium of
the payment game whose extensive form is displayed in Figure 2. This game yields a unique PBNE
in mixed strategies which is presented as lemma 1.9
Lemma 1 The unique PBNE in mixed strategy10 of this game is such that:
1-The entrepreneur always reports a low return when the actual return is low.
2-The entrepreneur reports a low return with probability ´, and a high return with probability
1¡ ´, when the actual return is high.
8Let V be the entrepreneur’s expected utility in a given period if he signs the contract, and let V be his expected
utility in autarchy. Then k = ±1¡±
¡
V ¡ V ¢.
9 In this game, the de…nitions of perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibrium coincide (see Myerson, 1991).
10Since we have a two-player game where each player has only two possible actions, there can be at most one
mixed-strategy equilibrium (see Gibbons, 1992).
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Figure 2: Extensive form of the payment game.
3-The …nancier never audits an entrepreneur who reports a high return.
4-The …nancier audits with probability º an entrepreneur who reports a low return.
´ and º are given by
´ =
µ
c
(RH ¡RL)D ¡ c
¶µ
1¡ ¼
¼
¶
(1)
and
º =
U (Y ¡RLD+WH)¡ U (Y ¡RHD +WH)
U (Y ¡RLD +WH)¡ U (Y ¡RHD +WH) + k (2)
Proof: All the proofs are in the appendix.²
It is clear that the only type of lie that occurs is the entrepreneur’s depiction of the true return
as being lower than in reality. This seems logical; if the entrepreneur needs to pay more to the
…nancier when the return on the investment is greater, then he will want to tell her that the return
is lower than in reality. This means that the entrepreneur never over-reports the return on the
project. Also, since the …nancier knows that the entrepreneur never reports that a project’s return
is high when in fact it is low, she knows for sure that the entrepreneur is telling the truth if he
reports a high return. There is therefore no need to audit in this circumstance. In the other cases,
the equilibrium of the game is such that the entrepreneur and the …nancier play mixed strategies.
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This means that in equilibrium, some entrepreneurs are successful at extracting rents from the
…nancier in the sense that some lie and are not audited. As shown by Gale and Hellwig (1989),
this equilibrium is the only stable equilibrium of the game.
3 The Model
3.1 Optimal Contract
The equilibrium strategies are constraints that the …nancier needs to consider when she designs
the contract. In other words, the behavior of the two players in the second stage are anticipated
rationally by the …nancier when she designs the contract in the …rst stage. The problem is then to
…nd a payment schedule (RL and RH), and an entrepreneur’s proportion of the investment ® that
maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected utility.
EU = U (Y ¡ ®I) + (1¡ ¼)U (Y ¡RLD +WL) (3)
+¼ (1¡ ´)U (Y ¡RHD+WH)
+¼´º [U (Y ¡RHD +WH)¡ k]
+¼´ (1¡ º)U (Y ¡RLD +WH)
By substituting for the values of ´ and º found in (1) and (2), (3) becomes
EU = U (Y ¡ ®I) + (1¡ ¼)U (Y ¡RLD +WL) + ¼U (Y ¡RHD +WH) (4)
We can restrict the analysis to only one period since all periods are the same, and the impact
of all future periods is incorporated into the penalty k. The problem for the …nancier is therefore
repeated every period as long as the entrepreneur is not caught cheating. There is no need for
the lender to build a reputation for auditing frequently in this model since the entrepreneur is
assumed to have no memory. This means that the past actions of the …nancier (for example always
auditing entrepreneurs who report a bad return) are never known to the entrepreneur. And since
the formulation of the problem is the same, there is no loss in generality studying a single period.
Besides the Nash equilibrium constraints, another constraint that is imposed on the …nancier
is that her expected pro…t must be zero. This means that the loan must be paid back entirely in
the next stage minus auditing expenses. This zero-pro…t constraint is then
D = (1¡ ¼)RLD + ¼ (1¡ ´)RHD + ¼´ºRHD + ¼´(1¡ º)RLD ¡ cº (1¡ ¼ + ¼´) (5)
The initial-stage loan on the left must be equal to the second-stage expected payback on the right.
(1 ¡ ¼) is the probability that the ROI is low, in which case the entrepreneur only needs to pay
9
RLD. ¼(1¡´) is the probability that the ROI is high and that the entrepreneur is telling the truth,
in which case he needs to pay RHD. The probability that he says the ROI is low when in fact it
is high is given by ´. When the entrepreneur lies, he is caught with probability º, in which case he
needs to pay the …nancier RHD. If he is not caught (with probability 1¡º), then he must pay only
RLD, which means that he was able to extract a rent from the …nancier. Finally, cº (1¡ ¼ + ¼´)
is the expected cost of the audit strategy.
By substituting for the value of ´ given in (1), it is easy to simplify (5) to
1¡ ¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL = ¡¼
µ
c
(RH ¡RL)D ¡ c
¶µ
1¡ ¼
¼
¶
(RH ¡RL) (6)
By de…nition RH > RL and
´ =
µ
c
(RH ¡RL)D ¡ c
¶µ
1¡ ¼
¼
¶
¸ 0 (7)
It is then clear that 1 ¡ ¼RH ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)RL < 0. What does the left hand side of equation (6)
represent? Presumably the …nancier will not want to invest if she expects a return that is lower
than some minimum. In other words, the expected return on the investment, ¼RH + (1 ¡ ¼)RL,
cannot be smaller than the minimum a …nancier is willing to accept (which is 1). Therefore the left
hand side of (6) represents the di¤erence between the …nancier’s minimum acceptable return and
the expected actual return on his loan. This di¤erence cannot be positive as it would mean that
the expected actual return is lower than the minimum.
Letting D = (1¡ ®) I and rearranging equation (6) yields
(1¡ ®) =
µ
1¡RH
1¡ ¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL
¶µ c
I
RH ¡RL
¶
(8)
This last equation gives us an equation for the proportion of the project that is …nanced externally.
The simpli…ed problem is then
max
RL;RH ;®
EU = U(Y ¡®I)+(1¡¼)U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)+¼U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) (SP)
subject11 to
® = 1¡
µ
1¡RH
1¡ ¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL
¶µ c
I
RH ¡RL
¶
(ZP)
WL ¡RL (1¡ ®) I ¸ 0 (LLL)
WH ¡RH (1¡ ®) I ¸ 0 (LLH)
11The PBNE constraints have been included directly in the zero-pro…t constraint, in the participation constraint,
and in the maximization problem.
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V ¸ V (PC)
ZP represents the zero-pro…t constraint of the …nancier. The LLi constraints are the limited
liability constraints. They stipulate that the entrepreneur cannot be forced to pay more than the
actual return on the project in any state of the world. In other words, if the amount he needs to
pay, Ri (1¡ ®), is greater than the wealth generated by the project, Wi, he may …le for bankruptcy
to protect his other assets. The last constraint is the participation constraint, which means that the
entrepreneur has to be better o¤ investing in this project than not investing. Let’s abstract from
the participation constraint and the limited liability constraints, and concentrate on an interior
solution.
Lemma 2 After substituting ZP into SP , and letting
®H =
@®
@RH
= (1¡ ®)
Ã
¼ (1¡RH)2 + (1¡ ¼) (1¡RL)2
(1¡RH) [1¡ ¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL] (RH ¡RL)
!
(9)
®L =
@®
@RL
= (1¡ ®)
Ã
(1¡ ¼) (RH ¡RL)2
(1¡RH) [1¡ ¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL] (RH ¡RL)
!
¡ ®H (10)
and
V 0 = (1¡ ¼)RLU
0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)
+¼RHU
0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ U 0(Y ¡ ®I) (11)
the two necessary conditions for an optimum are
(1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)
V 0
=
®L
1¡ ® (NC1)
and
¼U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
V 0
=
®H
1¡ ® (NC2)
It is interesting to note that the penalty in‡icted on those entrepreneurs who were found to
have cheated has no impact on the optimal contract. When we look at the necessary conditions for
an optimum (NC1 and NC2), nowhere do we see the penalty parameter k. This result contrasts
with that of Scheepens (1995) who …nds that the size of the penalty has a non-trivial impact on
the shape of the optimal contract.
The reason why the penalty has no impact on the optimal contract is a combination of two
e¤ects: the penalty is a deadweight loss, and the auditing occurs ex post. Since the …nancier
cannot use auditing as a way to recoup her auditing costs, auditing is purely a way of detecting
entrepreneurs who send false messages. It is easy to show that this independence no longer holds
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when the penalty is paid, in part or in total, to the …nancier. This is clear since the amount of
money the …nancier can recoup must be included as a revenue under zero-pro…t conditions. The
other e¤ect is that the …nancier’s decision to audit comes last. It is easy to show that the …nancier’s
probability of auditing decreases as the penalty increases (@º@k < 0). This means that the …nancier
adjusts her auditing strategy to compensate for the penalty. The adjustment is exactly such that
the penalty becomes irrelevant. This is due to the fact that the auditing strategy is chosen so
that the entrepreneur is indi¤erent to the choice of cheating or not cheating. By increasing the
penalty the …nancier must reduce her auditing probability in order for the entrepreneur to remain
indi¤erent in choosing either course of action. In the end, any change in the penalty is o¤set by a
change in the auditing strategy.
The policy implications of this …nding are striking. It will not be possible to alter the optimal
contract on the basis of the penalty in‡icted on those found to have sent a wrongful message.
Furthermore, increasing or reducing the deadweight penalty for sending a false message will not
a¤ect the probability of the entrepreneur sending a false message. The reason is simple; since the
contract is independent of the penalty, and since the penalty a¤ect the entrepreneur’s probability
of lying only via the optimal contract (´ depends on k only through RL and RH , see equation 1), it
follows that the entrepreneur’s decision to lie is independent of the penalty. The other interesting
features of the optimal contract are presented in the next two subsections of the paper.
3.2 Implications
The …rst implication of the optimal contract is that the entrepreneur’s …nal wealth is greater in the
state of the world where the return on the project is lower. This is presented as proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The entrepreneur’s …nal wealth is greater in the low return state than in the high
return state.
It may seem strange to see that the entrepreneur is better o¤ in a low ROI state than in a high
ROI state. This raises the possible problem that the entrepreneur may not want to invest all the
necessary time and e¤ort to make sure that the project has a high return. However, the investment
of some kind of e¤ort is not modelled here; we are only concerned about the problems of revealing
the true state of the world.
The entrepreneur is in essence penalized for having his project turn out to be a success, since he
is better o¤ in the low ROI state. The reason is that the entrepreneur is forced to not understate
the true return on the project. This is exactly what is happening. By increasing the di¤erence
between the payment in the high ROI state, RH(1¡ ®)I, and the payment in the low ROI state,
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RL(1 ¡ ®)I, the entrepreneur has to lower his probability of sending a false message concerning
the true return. Put di¤erently, as the di¤erence between RH and RL increases, the probability of
lying, ´, decreases. Since the …nancier has more to gain by auditing, the entrepreneur must reduce
his probability of sending a false message in order for the …nancier to remain indi¤erent about
auditing or not auditing.
If there were no ex post moral hazard, it can be readily demonstrated and quite intuitively
grasped that the entrepreneur would choose a contract in which his second-period …nal wealth
is equal in the two states of the world. With ex post moral hazard however, we see that the
entrepreneur’s …nal wealth is greater if the project has a low return. Putting it a di¤erent way,
ex post moral hazard reduces the …nancier’s …nal wealth if the project has a low return. This
implicitly increases the willingness of the …nancier to make sure that the entrepreneur’s report of
a low return is truthful. Thus by increasing the di¤erence between what she collects in the high
return state and what she collects in the low return state, the …nancier sends the signal that she has
a lot to lose by letting the entrepreneur get away with announcing a false state of the world. The
entrepreneur then must scale down his probability of lying to internalize these implicit incentives
for the …nancier to audit.
The next question is then to …nd out what fraction of the project will be …nanced by the
entrepreneur. If ® = 0 (® = 1), then the entire project is outside (inside) …nanced.
Proposition 2 The entrepreneur …nances more than he needs. In other words, ® < 0:
A negative ® means that the amount levied through outside …nancing is greater than the cost
of the project (i.e.: D > I). It is interesting to note that the entrepreneur’s limited liability is but
a su¢cient constraint for ® to be negative. In fact, it is very easy to construct a numerical example
where there is no limited liability, and where ® is negative. An example of a negative ® is when the
entrepreneur consumes various perks. When entrepreneurs levy outside funds at a given moment in
time, the …nanciers know that they run the risk of having the entrepreneur use part of that loan to
increase his present consumption. What the present contract does is explicitly quantify the amount
of perks that entrepreneurs can consume today. Therefore perks can be viewed as the di¤erence
between the cost of the project and the amount of outside …nancing. The question that comes to
mind is why a …nancier would do such a thing?
The main reason for over-…nancing is that it implicitly forces her to audit more often, and thus
induces the entrepreneur to tell the truth with greater probability. It is clear that the …nancier has
more to lose by not auditing if she lends more. The amount at stake is given by (RH¡RL)(1¡®)I.
This means that ceteris paribus a smaller ® (i.e., a greater share invested by the …nancier in the
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project) increases the amount at risk. Since there is more to be lost, the entrepreneur will have to
reduce his probability of sending a false message. In other words, we have that @´@® > 0.
A possible explanation for this result is that over-…nancing represents some kind of bribe paid ex
ante to the entrepreneur. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that it would be possible to solve the
ex ante ine¢ciency encountered in Jensen and Meckling (1976) if we were to let the entrepreneur
accept a bribe. This bribe would allow the optimal level of investment to be obtained. However,
the bribes that Shleifer and Vishny talk about are bribes that would induce the entrepreneur to
invest in the socially optimal project. This is more a case of adverse selection between projects.
In our setup, there is only one type of project, with more than one outcome. This means that a
bribe does not necessarily work since some entrepreneurs still lie about the true outcome of a risky
project.
Another possible explanation for this over-…nancing is that the …nancier is also acting as an
insurer in smoothing marginal utilities across states. We know that the entrepreneur will not invest
in the project in the …rst period if it does not give him greater expected wealth in the second period.
It then makes sense that he would want to transfer some of that excess second-period wealth to
the initial period.
Another interesting feature of the contract is that it allows negative interest rates. This …nding
is presented in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If WL < I, then RL < 1.
A negative interest rate just means that the entrepreneur needs to reimburse less than the face
value of the loan itself. This result is not unusual. It is implicit in debt contracts in which an
entrepreneur sees all his assets seized when he cannot make a scheduled payment that the interest
rate in those states is negative. What is more interesting with the present contract is that the
entrepreneur does not need to give away all his assets in the low return state. In fact, since the
entrepreneur’s ex post wealth is greater in the low return state, it cannot be that all the project’s
realized returns are paid to the …nancier. In other words, RL <
WL
(1¡®)I , whatever the value of WL.
Moreover, nothing in this contract prevents the …nancier from giving money to the entrepreneur if
the return on the project is low. To see how that can happen, suppose that the project is a total
bust. With WL = 0;we must have RL < 0 since RL < WL(1¡®)I . This means that the …nancier would
pay the entrepreneur some amount if the ROI is low.
A direct consequence of this corollary is that the entrepreneur is always able to ful…ll the
provisions of the contract when the ROI is low. In other words, the limited liability constraint
in the low ROI state is never binding. Obviously the limited liability constraint is more stringent
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when the entrepreneur’s wealth is lower. Here the entrepreneur’s wealth is lower in the state where
the ROI is high. Therefore the only time an entrepreneur may declare bankruptcy12 is if the ROI is
high. This raises the interesting point that if the entrepreneur is bankrupt, the …nancier will never
audit him.
This result stems from the reporting and auditing behavior of the players. We know from the
PBNE that with some probability the entrepreneur will tell the truth if the ROI is low. We also
know that if the entrepreneur declares that his project has a high ROI then the …nancier never
audits him. Combined with the fact that bankruptcy can only occur in the high ROI state, it
follows that an entrepreneur who declares bankruptcy is never audited. This …nding is completely
the opposite of the one that is predicted through standard debt contracts à la Gale and Hellwig
(1985) whereby an entrepreneur who declares bankruptcy is audited.
This contract resembles the implicit contract between rich countries and poor countries in the
sense that it gives a rationale for debt forgiveness if the borrowing country’s project fails. From
Corollary 1, we see that it may sometimes be optimal to give extra money to countries whose return
on an investment project was very poor. It also gives a rationale for the international boycott of
any future lending to a country who is found to have misreported the success of an investment
project. Finally, the contract is such that the borrowing country borrows more than it needs to
undertake the project in order to increase current consumption.
Since the …nancier cannot commit to auditing due to the cost of doing so, the contract is such
that part of the debt is forgiven in the event that the return on the investment is low. When the
return on the investment is high, however, the borrowing country ends up paying a lot in interest
payments, which corresponds to the high risk such a country faces.
Unfortunately, the contract we obtain still allows some ine¢ciency to remain in the economy. A
major ine¢ciency that exists is that some investments that have a positive net present value (NPV)
are not undertaken because of the cost of conducting the audits. We show this as a corollary.
Corollary 2 Suppose there exists a project whose NPV is given by " = ¼WH +(1¡¼)WL¡ I > 0.
As "! 0+, then the project will not be undertaken.
This corollary shows that the possibility for the entrepreneur to extract a rent from the …nancier
prevents projects that would be bene…cial for society from being undertaken. Having positive NPV
projects be put on ice is a common outcome when there are agency problems in the economy, even
when the …nancier can commit to every provision of the debt contract. The reason is that the
money necessary to conduct audits has to come from somewhere. It will typically come from the
12 In the sense that all the project’s returns are given to the bank: Wi = Ri(1¡ ®)I.
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entrepreneur paying a higher interest rate when his project has a high return. Therefore the same
project could have a positive NPV using the interest rates when there is no possibility of moral
hazard, and a negative NPV when interest rates are adjusted to compensate for the audits.
3.3 Commitment
In this section of the paper we compare the results under no commitment to those obtained under
full commitment. This means that the revelation principle is used to derive the optimal contract.
The problem is then
max
RL;RH ;®;º
EU = U(Y ¡®I) + (1¡¼)U(Y ¡RL(1¡®)I +WL) +¼U(Y ¡RH(1¡®)I +WH) (12)
subject to
(1¡ ¼)RL (1¡ ®) I + ¼RH (1¡ ®) I ¡ cº (1¡ ¼)¡ (1¡ ®) I = 0 (13)
U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) + k ¡ º = 0 (14)
EU¤ ¸ 2U(Y ) (15)
The next proposition can now be stated.
Proposition 3 If the …nancier can commit to an auditing strategy, then the optimal contract is
such that the entrepreneur’s …nal wealth is greater in the high return state.
This result is the complete opposite of the one we obtained in the previous section of the paper.
It is, however, in line with traditional results in the literature. It is interesting to note that by
merely removing the commitment assumption, the shape of the optimal contract is reversed. In one
case the entrepreneur is better o¤ if the project has a high return, while in the other he is better o¤
if the project has a low return. The reason why the shape of the contract is reversed is that under
commitment, the …nancier does not need to embed provisions in the contract that will make her
more inclined to audit; the commitment assumption does that. Since she does not need to make it
sequentially rational to audit, the …nancier can then concentrate on reducing the incentive for the
entrepreneur to misreport by reducing the possible gains from it. With commitment, the optimal
contract is such that the entrepreneur’s …nal wealth is more equal than without commitment, which
makes the gains from cheating smaller.
One may wonder if there is a loss of well-being associated with the …nancier’s inability to
commit to an auditing strategy. It is clear from the revelation principle that the allocation under
commitment is Pareto optimal. The question is whether the allocation under no commitment is
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Pareto-equal to the allocation under commitment. The answer is no; there is a loss of welfare
associated with the …nancier not being able to commit. This is stated formally as Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 The allocation under no commitment is Pareto dominated.
This proposition tells us that there would be a welfare gain from being able to commit. This
…nding is intuitive. Since without commitment the entrepreneur is indi¤erent to the choice of
cheating or not cheating (the …nancier’s auditing strategy is such that the entrepreneur is indeed
indi¤erent), there is a loss of welfare associated with the fact that more auditing is conducted under
no commitment than under commitment. This means that more resources are devoted to auditing
when there is no commitment, even if the entrepreneur is indi¤erent about cheating or not cheating.
There is a loss of welfare in this.
Given that the allocation under no commitment is Pareto-dominated by the allocation under
full commitment, and given that the entrepreneur’s …nal wealth is greater in the low (high) ROI
state when the …nancier cannot (can) commit to an auditing strategy, how does this translate into
the amount borrowed? Enter Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Outside …nancing is greater if the …nancier cannot commit to an auditing strategy
than if she can commit.
When the …nancier cannot commit explicitly to an auditing strategy, she needs to modify the
optimal contract to imbed an implicit commitment to audit more often. This implicit commitment
is achieved by sending a message such that it would be too costly for the …nancier not to audit.
This signal is sent in two ways. First, the entrepreneur’s …nal wealth is greater in the low return
state than in the high return state. This means that the …nancier has more to lose by not auditing.
It is clear from the entrepreneur’s probability of cheating (´) that the greater the di¤erence between
his payo¤ in the high return state and his payo¤ in the low return state, the smaller his probability
of announcing the false state of the world (i.e., @´@(RH¡RL) < 0). The second way the signal is sent
is through the proportion of the project …nanced externally. By engaging more wealth into the
project the …nancier has more to lose when the entrepreneur declares that the ROI is low. Again
from the entrepreneur’s probability of cheating (´), we see that as the amount internally …nanced
increases (® increases), the probability of announcing the false state of the world decreases ( @´@® > 0).
Therefore, the entrepreneur will cheat less when ® is smaller.
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4 Discussion and Conclusion
The main results of the paper revolve around the counter-intuitive ways that a …nancier induces
the entrepreneur to tell the truth with greater probability. When the …nancier cannot commit
explicitly to an auditing strategy, he must instead use an implicit commitment. One way to do
this is by increasing the amount that the …nancier has at risk by not auditing; she needs to signal
that audits will be more frequent because she has more to lose by not auditing. In the model, the
implicit signal is sent in two ways.
First, the …nancier increases the di¤erence between the money owed to her by the entrepreneur
in the high- and low-return states. We see that the amount of money the …nancier collects is
greater if the return on investment is high. This explains why the entrepreneur is better o¤ when
his project has a low ROI. By being so much better o¤ when the ROI is high, the …nancier is
implicitly saying that she will make sure whenever the entrepreneur reveals a low ROI that he has
told the truth. Compared with the case of a standard debt contract where RL =
WL
I , and RH = R
such that 1 = ¼R + (1 ¡ ¼)WLI , our contract is much less equitable: RL < WLI , and RH > R.
Although this contract seems less equitable than a standard debt contract, the entrepreneur ends
up having a lower probability of cheating than if he were faced with a standard debt contract. This
conclusion is straightforward from the equation that determines ´, the entrepreneur’s probability
of reporting a false ROI. Taking the partial derivative with respect to RL and RH yields
@´
@RL
> 0
and @´@RH < 0. Therefore, an increase in RH and a reduction in RL reduces the probability of the
entrepreneur misreporting the true return on his risky project.
The second way that the …nancier sends an implicit signal about her willingness to audit is
through the amount of money she invests. By over-…nancing the entrepreneur’s project, the …nancier
is implicitly saying that she has more to lose by not auditing. Therefore we should expect her to
audit more often when she invests more money in the entrepreneur’s project. Knowing that the
…nancier will audit more often will induce the entrepreneur to cheat less often. This result is
straightforward from ´. Clearly, the smaller ® is, the smaller the probability of committing fraud.
This contract may explain why banks and other lenders accept a certain amount of perquisites
consumption by the managers of corporation. By letting the entrepreneur consume perquisites in
the …rst stage, the …nancier signals that she has relatively more to lose by not auditing in the second
stage, which induces the entrepreneur to misreport the state of the world with lower probability.
The ex post moral hazard problem has a major drawback, however, since some projects which
might be bene…cial to society are not undertaken. We therefore have some under-investment in the
economy as a whole, even if individual projects are over-…nanced.
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It would be possible to view the model developed herein as a sovereign debt model. The only
penalty that a lender can impose on a sovereign nation is a refusal to lend further money. The
penalty is therefore not paid to anyone, it is just a reduction in the utility of the entrepreneur.
The contract also gives a rationale for forgiving the debt of poorer countries as an implicit con-
tract between the lending country (…nancier) and the borrowing country (entrepreneur). Since the
…nancier cannot commit, the implicit contract between the …nancier and the entrepreneur is such
that part of the debt is forgiven in case the return on the investment is low. When the return on
the investment is high, however, the borrowing country ends up paying considerable amounts in
interest payments, which corresponds to the high risk that country faces.
The goal of this paper was to derive the optimal contract between an entrepreneur who has
private information about the realized return on a risky project and an uninformed …nancier. We
concentrated on the problem of the entrepreneur’s possibility of misreporting the return in order
to extract a rent from the …nancier. There was only one possible project whose setup cost was
…xed, which involved no e¤ort on the part of the entrepreneur to make sure that the higher return
was realized. In other words, we concentrated purely on an ex post moral hazard problem à la
Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985). The originality of the paper lies in the fact that
the assumption of the …nancier’s commitment to an auditing strategy is relaxed. This means that
the optimality of the debt contract must be reconsidered.
In summary, we …nd that the entrepreneur is better o¤ in the low return-on-investment state
than in the high return-on-investment state in the sense that his ex post wealth is greater. We
also …nd that an entrepreneur who wants to invest in a risky project will …nance more on the
outside than he would have had the …nancier been able to commit to an auditing strategy. Outside
Over-…nancing is a way for the …nancier to signal to the entrepreneur that she has more to lose,
and thus that the entrepreneur should commit fraud less often. The converse is also true: since the
entrepreneur has more to gain, the …nancier should audit more often. Increasing outside …nancing
is therefore a way of solving part of the asymmetry problem by reducing one player’s incentive to
cheat and by increasing the other player’s incentive to audit. The optimal contract is con…ned to a
particular equilibrium of the problem posed by Gale and Hellwig (1989), which they call separating.
Finally, we …nd a loss of welfare associated with the …nancier’s inability to commit.
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5 Appendix: Tables and Proofs
Table 1
Undiscounted monetary payo¤s to the entrepreneur and the …nancier which are
contingent on their actions and the state of the world.
State of
the world
Action of
Entrepreneur
Action of
Financier
Payo¤ to
Entrepreneur
Payo¤ to
Financier
First stage Invest I
Invest
(1¡ ®)I U (Y ¡ ®I) ¡(1¡ ®)I
Low ROI Report WL Audit U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL) RL(1¡ ®)I ¡ c
Low ROI Report WL Don’t audit U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL) RL(1¡ ®)I
Low ROI Report WH Audit U (Y ¡RL(1 ¡ ®)I +W L)¡k RL(1 ¡ ®)I ¡ c
Low ROI Report WH Don’t audit U (Y ¡RH(1 ¡ ®)I +W L) RH(1 ¡ ®)I
High ROI Report WL Audit U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ k RH(1¡ ®)I ¡ c
High ROI Report WL Don’t audit U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH) RL(1¡ ®)I
High ROI Report WH Audit U (Y ¡RH(1 ¡ ®)I +WH) RH(1 ¡ ®)I ¡ c
High ROI Report WH Don’t audit U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) RH(1¡ ®)I
The contingent states in italics never occur in equilibrium: they represent actions that are
o¤ the equilibrium path.
Proof of lemma 1. Looking at the right side of Figure 2, it is obvious that °H = 1. Suppose
Nature chooses the return to be low (WL). Reporting a low return (W 0L) always dominates reporting
a high return (W 0H), whatever the …nancier does. When the …nancier hears messageW
0
H , she knows
with certainty that it is truthful, which means that °H = 1. Thus the only meaningful strategy
for the …nancier when a W 0H message is sent is to never audit. We have now found three of the six
elements of the sextuplet.
Lets now move to the left side of …gure 2. By Bayes’ rule °L, the …nancier’s posterior belief
that the true return is low given that the entrepreneur sent message W 0L, is equal to
°L =
1¡ ¼
(1¡ ¼) + ¼´ (16)
Only one strategy of the entrepreneur will induce the …nancier to be indi¤erent about auditing or
not auditing a message. That strategy must be such that °L solves
(¡c+RH(1¡ ®)I)°L + (¡c+RL(1¡ ®)I)(1¡ °L) = RH(1¡ ®)I (17)
and
°L =
(RH ¡RL)(1¡ ®)I ¡ c
(RH ¡RL)(1¡ ®)I (18)
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Substituting (18) in (16) yields
´ =
µ
c
(RH ¡RL)(1¡ ®)I ¡ c
¶µ
1¡ ¼
¼
¶
(19)
All that is left to calculate is the auditing strategy of the …nancier when the agent reports W 0L.
Her strategy must be such that the entrepreneur is indi¤erent about telling the truth or sending a
false message, given that the return is high. º, the probability of auditing a W 0L message, equals
º =
U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) + k (20)
Since all six elements of our PBNE have been found, the proof is done.²
Proof of lemma 2. The …rst-order conditions of this problem are
@EU
@RL
= (1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)RL®LI (FOCL)
¡(1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL) (1¡ ®)I
+¼U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)RH®LI ¡ U 0(Y ¡ ®I)®LI
@EU
@RH
= ¼U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)RH®HI (FOCH)
¡¼U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) (1¡ ®)I
+(1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)RL®HI ¡ U 0(Y ¡ ®I)®HI
rearranging the terms yields the desired result.²
Proof of proposition 1. Taking the ratio of the necessary conditions yields
NC1
NC2
=
(1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)
¼U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) =
®L
1¡®
®H
1¡®
(21)
We want to show that the entrepreneur’s wealth is greater in the low ROI state. If this is true,
then the entrepreneur’s marginal utility will be greater in the high ROI state
U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL) < U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) (22)
We know that
U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)
U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) =
µ
¼
1¡ ¼
¶µ
®L
®H
¶
(23)
Thus (22) holds if and only if ¼®L < (1¡ ¼)®H . Recall from (9) that
®H = (1¡ ®)
Ã
(1¡ ¼) (RH ¡RL)2
(1¡RH)(RH ¡RL) [1¡ (1¡ ¼)RL ¡ ¼RH ]
!
¡ ®L (24)
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We then arrive at ¼®L < (1¡ ¼)®H if and only if
¼®L < (1¡ ¼)
"
(1¡ ®)
Ã
(1¡ ¼) (RH ¡RL)2
(1¡RH)(RH ¡RL)[1¡ (1¡ ¼)RL ¡ ¼RH ]
!
¡ ®L
#
(25)
and
®L < (1¡ ®)
Ã
(1¡ ¼) (RH ¡RL)2
(1¡RH)(RH ¡RL) [1¡ (1¡ ¼)RL ¡ ¼RH ]
!
(26)
Substituting for ®L given in (10) and simplifying, ¼®L < (1¡ ¼)®H if and only if
¼(1¡ ¼) (RH ¡RL)2 ¡ (1¡ ¼) (1¡RL)2 ¡ ¼ (1¡RH)2 < 0 (27)
Expanding the squares yields
¼(1¡ ¼)
³
R2H ¡ 2RHRL +R2L
´
¡ (1¡ ¼)
³
1¡ 2RL +R2L
´
¡ ¼
³
1¡ 2RH +R2H
´
< 0 (28)
Combining terms
¡¼2R2H ¡ (1¡ ¼)2R2L ¡ 1¡ 2¼(1¡ ¼)RHRL + 2(1¡ ¼)RL + 2¼RH < 0 (29)
Finally
¡ [1¡ ¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL)]2 < 0 (30)
which is obviously true.²
Proof of proposition 2. Let’s rewrite NC1 and NC2 as
(1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL) = ®L
1¡ ®V
0 (31)
¼U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) = ®H
1¡ ®V
0 (32)
Expanding V 0 we have
(1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL) = ®L
1¡ ®
264 (1¡ ¼)RLU 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)+¼RHU 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
¡U 0(Y ¡ ®I)
375 (33)
and
¼U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) = ®H
1¡ ®
264 (1¡ ¼)RLU 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)+¼RHU 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
¡U 0(Y ¡ ®I)
375 (34)
Combining terms yields
(1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL) =
Ã ®L
1¡®
1¡ ®L1¡®RL
!"
¼RHU
0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
¡U 0(Y ¡ ®I)
#
(35)
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¼U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) =
Ã ®H
1¡®
1¡ ®H1¡®RH
!"
(1¡ ¼)RLU 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)
¡U 0(Y ¡ ®I)
#
(36)
We can rearrange these equations as
U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)
U 0(Y ¡ ®I) = ¡
µ
1
1¡ ¼
¶ ®L
1¡®
1¡ ®H1¡®RH ¡ ®L1¡®RL
(37)
U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
U 0(Y ¡ ®I) = ¡
µ
1
¼
¶ ®H
1¡®
1¡ ®H1¡®RH ¡ ®L1¡®RL
(38)
Using (10) and (9), and the fact that
1¡ ®H
1¡ ®RH ¡
®L
1¡ ®RL =
(1¡ ¼) (RH ¡RL)
(1¡ ¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL) (1¡RH) < 0 (39)
(37) and (38) can be rewritten as
U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)
U 0(Y ¡ ®I) =
(1¡ ¼) (RH ¡RL)2 ¡ ¼ (1¡RH)2 ¡ (1¡ ¼) (1¡RL)2
(1¡ ¼)2 (RH ¡RL)2
(40)
and
U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
U 0(Y ¡ ®I) =
¼ (1¡RH)2 + (1¡ ¼) (1¡RL)2
¼(1¡ ¼) (RH ¡RL)2
(41)
Only (41) is needed for the remainder of the proof. It is easily shown that
¼ (1¡RH)2 + (1¡ ¼) (1¡RL)2
¼(1¡ ¼) (RH ¡RL)2
> 1 (42)
It follows that
U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
U 0(Y ¡ ®I) > 1 (43)
Therefore the entrepreneur’s wealth in the high ROI state must be smaller than his …rst-stage
wealth. Therefore the entrepreneur’s proportion of the project must be smaller than
® <
RHI ¡WH
(1 +RH)I
(44)
On the other hand, the limited liability constraint in the high ROI state stipulates that (1¡®)RHI ·
WH , which can also be written as
® >
RHI ¡WH
RHI
(45)
Combining (44) and (45), the limited liability constraint and the necessary condition hold when
RHI ¡WH
(1 +RH)I
> ® >
RHI ¡WH
RHI
(46)
It is a straightforward observation that (46) holds only if RHI ¡WH < 0. Since (1 +RH)I > 0, ®
must be negative.²
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Proof of corollary 1. From the limited liability constraint in the low ROI state, we see that
WL ¸ RL(1¡®)I. If we suppose that WL < I, then either RL < 1, or ® > 0. But from proposition
2 we know that ® < 0. Thus it has to be that if WL < I, then RL < 1.²
Proof of corollary 2. From (6) we know that
1¡ ¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL = ¡¼
µ
c
(RH ¡RL) (1¡ ®) I ¡ c
¶µ
1¡ ¼
¼
¶
(RH ¡RL) (47)
Multiplying both sides by I = ¼WH + (1¡ ¼)WL ¡ " > 0, and using (1) yield
[1¡ ¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL] [¼WH + (1¡ ¼)WL ¡ "] = ¡¼´(RH ¡RL) [¼WH + (1¡ ¼)WL ¡ "] (48)
This can be rewritten as
[1¡ ¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL] [¼WH + (1¡ ¼)WL ¡ "] = ¡¼´(RH ¡RL)I (49)
¼WH + (1¡ ¼)WL ¡ "¡ [¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL] [¼WH + (1¡ ¼)WL ¡ "] = ¡¼´(RH ¡RL)I (50)
Obviously the right hand side of this equation is negative, which means that
" > ¼WH + (1¡ ¼)WL ¡ [¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL] I (51)
and
" > ¼[WH ¡RHI] + (1¡ ¼)[WL ¡RLI] (52)
As " approaches zero, we …nd that
0 > ¼[WH ¡RHI] + (1¡ ¼)[WL ¡RLI] (53)
which is not possible since the limited liability constraints mandate us to have
WH ¡RHI > 0 (54)
WL ¡RLI > 0 (55)
Therefore a number of projects that have a positive net present value will not be undertaken.²
Proof of proposition 3. Concentrating on an interior solution, the six …rst-order conditions
of the problem with commitment are
@V
@RL
= 0 = ¡ (1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL) (1¡ ®) I + ¸1 (1¡ ¼) (1¡ ®) I (56)
¡¸2 (1¡ ®) IU
0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH) k
[U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ k]2
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@V
@RH
= 0 = ¡¼U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) (1¡ ®) I + ¸1¼ (1¡ ®) I (57)
+¸2
(1¡ ®) IU 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)k
[U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) + k]2
@V
@º
= 0 = ¡¸1 (1¡ ¼) c¡ ¸2 (58)
@V
@®
= 0 = ¡U 0(Y ¡ ®I)I + ¼U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)RHI (59)
+(1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)RLI + ¸1 [1¡ ¼RH ¡ (1¡ ¼)RL] I
+¸2Ik
RLU
0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡RHU 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
[U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) + k]2
@V
@¸1
= 0 = (1¡ ¼)RL (1¡ ®) I + ¼RH (1¡ ®) I ¡ (1¡ ®) I ¡ cº (1¡ ¼) (60)
@V
@¸2
= 0 = ¡
·
º ¡ U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) + k
¸
(61)
From @V@RL = 0 and
@V
@RH
= 0 we obtain
¸2k
­
= ¡(1¡ ¼)U
0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)¡ ¸1 (1¡ ¼)
U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH) (62)
¸2k
­
=
¼U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ ¸1¼
U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) (63)
where
­ = [U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡ U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) + k]2 > 0 (64)
This gives us an expression for ¸1 and ¸2
¸1 = U
0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
¼U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)
+ (1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)
¼U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)
+ (1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
(65)
and
¸2 = ¼ (1¡ ¼) 1
k
­
U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)¡U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)
¼U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH) + (1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) (66)
From @V@º = 0, we know that ¸2 = ¡ (1¡ ¼) c¸1. Thus
U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) = ¡¼ 1
ck
­
U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH)
¡U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)
¼U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WH)
+ (1¡ ¼)U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL)
(67)
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Since U 0 (:) > 0, this equation holds if and only if
U 0 (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) < U 0 (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL) (68)
which means that the agent’s …nal wealth is greater in the high ROI state.²
Proof of proposition 4. It is interesting to note that the maximizing function is the same
under commitment as under no commitment. Using the envelope theorem it is then su¢cient
to show that the zero-pro…t constraint is more binding in the no-commitment case than in the
commitment case. The way we shall proceed is to show for any equilibrium value of the repayment,
(RL; RH), that the proportion invested in the commitment case is greater. Let the variables used
for the commitment case be denoted byb, and for the no-commitment case bye. We want to show
for any (RL; RH), that b® > e®. We know that
b® = 1+ (1¡ ¼) bº cI
1¡ ¼dRH ¡ (1¡ ¼)dRL (69)
and e® = 1¡Ã 1¡gRH
1¡ ¼gRH ¡ (1¡ ¼)gRL
!Ã
c
IgRH ¡gRL
!
(70)
We then get that b® > e® if and only if
bº < ¡µ 1
1¡ ¼
¶Ã
1¡gRHgRH ¡gRL
!Ã
1¡ ¼dRH ¡ (1¡ ¼)dRL
1¡ ¼gRH ¡ (1¡ ¼)gRL
!
(71)
Evaluating
³gRL;gRH´ and ³dRL;dRH´at some (RL; RH), we get
bº < ¡µ 1
1¡ ¼
¶µ
1¡RH
RH ¡RL
¶
(72)
which is always true since
³ ¡1
1¡¼
´³
1¡RH
RH¡RL
´
> 1. Therefore for any (RL; RH), b® > e®. And since the
maximizing function is the same, it has to be that the entrepreneur is better o¤ under commitment.²
Proof of proposition 5. What we want to show here is that in equilibrium, c®¤ ¸ f®¤. The
way we shall proceed is to show that this inequality holds at the extremities of the distribution of
a parameter. Using (71) and substituting for the value of bº obtained by solving @V@¸2 = 0 yields
bº =
24 U ³Y ¡dRL(1¡ b®)I +WH´
¡U
³
Y ¡dRH(1¡ b®)I +WH´
35
24 U ³Y ¡dRL(1¡ b®)I +WH´
¡U
³
Y ¡dRH(1¡ b®)I +WH´+ bk
35 < ¡
µ
1
1¡ ¼
¶ µ 1¡fRHfRH¡fRL
¶
µ
1¡¼fRH¡(1¡¼)fRL
1¡¼cRH¡(1¡¼)cRL
¶ (73)
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Bear in mind that the non-negative penalty is given by
k =
µ
±
1¡ ±
¶³
V ¡ V
´
(74)
As k !1 (which happens when ± ! 1), bº ! 0. It is clear that (73) always holds since the right
hand side is always positive. As ± ! 0, k ! 0, which means that bº ! 1. In that case the optimal
contract is the same with commitment as without commitment; that is
³gR¤L;gR¤H´ = ³dR¤L;dR¤H´.
Thus (73) holds since
³
¡1
1¡¼
´µ
1¡fRHfRH¡fRL
¶
> 1. The last step is to show that
¡
µ
1
1¡ ¼
¶Ã
1¡gRHgRH ¡gRL
!Ã
1¡ ¼dRH ¡ (1¡ ¼)dRL
1¡ ¼gRH ¡ (1¡ ¼)gRL
!
(75)
is continuous and monotonous in k. We know from the necessary conditions for an optimum when
there is no commitment that the penalty does not a¤ect the shape of the optimal contract; that
is
³gR¤L;gR¤H´ is independent of k. This means that we can concentrate on deriving the e¤ect of k
solely on 1 ¡ ¼dRH ¡ (1¡ ¼)dRL. It is clear that this is continuous and monotone decreasing in k
(the greater the penalty, the closer to the …rst-best allocation we are going to get). As k increases,dRH increases anddRL decreases, so that eventually, as k !1, dRH anddRL are chosen such that
U (Y ¡RL(1¡ ®)I +WL) = U (Y ¡RH(1¡ ®)I +WH) = U (Y ¡ ®I) (76)
which means that the …rst best is achieved and that the marginal utilities in every state and every
stage of the game are equalized.²
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